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THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
IN A LITIGIOUS SOCIETY
ELMER W. JOHNSON*
ROBERT S. OSBORNE**
[W]e have created an incredibly overregulated and
litigious society. Instead of using the law for the structur-
ing of responsible corporate governance, we have created
the total adversary society . . . . As a result more and
more people spend more and more time not in producing
more wealth but in arguing over how to divide up a
rather static level of wealth.'
THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY
State law has always regarded directors and officers of cor-
porations as fiduciaries for stockholders. In the eyes of the law,
those who manage and direct corporations are not fiduciaries for
creditors, employees, consumers or any other sector of the public.
Accordingly, by virtue of two hundred years of legal conditioning,
corporate executives tend to think in terms of a clear line of authority:
the employees act for the officers, who are agents of the corpora-
tion, which is managed by the directors as fiduciaries for the
stockholders. The ultimate source of corporate authority is owner-
ship and, subject only to compliance with applicable law, executives
have come to understand that they owe their undivided loyalty to
the stockholders. Under state law, so long as directors act in com-
pliance with law and in accordance with their own good faith deter-
minations of the best interests of the stockholders, they will not in-
cur personal liability and will not even be questioned as to whether
they are acting in a socially responsible manner.
With occasional protests from those who would hold corporate
executives accountable to broader constituencies of society,'
* Partner in Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois
** Associate of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois
1. Johnson, Fidicary Ethics and the Market, in CAN THE MARKET SUSTAIN AN
ETHIC? 31, 44 (1978) (presented at the University of Chicago as one of the 1977 D.R.
Sharpe Lectures on Social Ethics).
2. See, for example, the famous 1932 debate between Professors Dodd and
Berle. In Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932), Professor Dodd argued that managers should be encouraged to act as "trustees"
not only for stockholders but also for employees, customers and perhaps other consti-
tuencies. Professor Berle promptly responded, in Berle, For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), with the view that, at least until
Johnson and Osborne: The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
50 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
managers have long derived their dominant mind-set from the tradi-
tional rule that they are fiduciaries solely for stockholders. In our
view, this legal structure and the associated mind-set have had un-
for" nate consequences. It is true that the traditional fiduciary doc-
trine has been consonant with free market concepts of the efficient
allocation of capital resources. Yet, as large corporations emerged in
this century as important social institutions and as the decisions of
corporate managers came to exert a major impact on our environ-
ment, our safety, our tastes and our workplaces, in the absence of
fiduciary concepts of adequate scope, we were compelled to regulate
corporate conduct by developing ever more government agencies
and regulations, and ever more private rights of action. In short, we
produced a litigious society: 3 we hemmed the corporate executive in
on all sides and created a war-like atmosphere in which we rely on
adversarial proceedings to keep corporations and their managers in
line. As a result, the possibility of true leadership.and stewardship
on the part of the executive has been sadly diminished.
Focusing on the symptoms of excessive litigation and regula-
tion, some have suggested reforms of our system of legal ad-
ministration." More judges are sought to expedite the process and
new administrative agencies are sought to bring expertise to the
issues. We also seek solutions in terms of procedure: possibly the
we are prepared to enunciate clear standards of fiduciary obligations to constituencies
other than stockholders, it is irresponsible to permit management some vague and am-
biguous latitude in making corporate decisions. See note 96 infra. Cf., Herald Co. v.
Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1092 (10th Cir. 1972) (directors may consider their obligations
to employees and the public in resisting a takeover); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
486 F. Supp. 1168, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (directors resisted takeover because not in best
interest of the company, "its shareholders, and communities served by the company").
3. See generally Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 767 (1977). In the federal district courts, 138,770 civil and 35,983 criminal cases
were filed in 1978. For each authorized judgeship, 438 new cases were filed and 413
cases were pending. In the federal courts of appeals, each three-judge panel had an
average of 585 cases pending in June 1978. Annual Report of the Director, Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts 102-08 (1978). These and other figures
set new records. Between 1962 and 1977, the number of corporate filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission increased from 18,000 to 52,000 per year. See
What the SEC Will Do With All Those Filings, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 18, 1980, at 70,
72.
4. For the views of some judges, obviously central to the legal process, see
Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1978); Phillips, The Expan-
sion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. L. REV. 17 (1978).
See generally Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3
(1978); Grossman & Sarat, Litigation in the Federal Courts: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 9 LAW & Soc. REV. 321 (1975).
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losing party in litigation should pay the legal fees and costs incurred
by the successful party, at least in certain circumstances; perhaps
severe limitations should be imposed on the present practice of
unlimited civil discovery, with its manifold possibilities of harass-
ment and misuse of discovered information; or perhaps better out-of-
court mechanisms can be developed for the resolution of disputes.
Many of these proposals are sound, even necessary, but identifica-
tion of the challenge solely at the systemic level has distracted our
attention and prevented us from raising more fundamental inquiries
concerning the chief victims of the legal malaise: the modern cor-
poration and its directors and officers.
The litigious society has cast the corporation and its manage-
ment as the ultimate adversaries, as the paradigmatic targets for
the venting of the public spleen. As the volume of litigation generally
has increased, the nature of actions brought against large corpora-
tions has evolved. For example, when General Motors Corporation
installed certain V-8 engines produced by its Chevrolet division in
1977 cars assembled by its Oldsmobile division, it touched off a
storm of litigation that would have been beyond imagination in
another era. From March 1977 through late 1978, more than 300
engine interchange lawsuits were brought against General Motors,
including 41 private class actions and 33 proceedings instituted by
state Attorneys General.5
This example illustrates the broader problem: resort to the
courts for redress of every perceived harm has not only choked our
system of law, it has also gone far toward paralyzing our economic
system. The ultimate consequence of the adversary society is the
ever-increasing transfer of human and non-human capital from
wealth-producing roles to what Arthur Laffer, a brash young
economist, calls the "garbage" business," all at great cost to our
society in terms of inflated prices for corporate goods and services.
This "garbage" business develops when:
1) new laws create new agencies and rights of both govern-
mental and private action, which in turn
2) require vast numbers of additional government attorneys
5. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d
1106, 1114 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. General Motors Corp., 444
U.S. 870 (1979). For a description of several recent class actions of rhajor economic
significance, see Getting Into Those Deep Pockets, FORBES. Aug. 4, 1980, at 59.
6. Professor Laffer made these observations in a 1979 address to the Chicago
Committee of the Council on Foreign Relations.
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and other employees as well as private plaintiffs' attorneys and
their employees to pursue these rights of action, which in turn
3) requires corporations to radically augment the size of their
staffs of lawyers, accountants and government relations personnel
and to keep outside law firms, accounting firms and other experts
close by their sides in order to cope with all the new regulatory
developments and litigation, which in turn
4) requires the top management of corporations to spend
much more time consulting with these professional advisers so as to
avoid the ever-increasing risks of personal and corporate liability,
which in turn
5) means that corporate managers today have necessarily
tended to become cautious, prudent and non-risk taking preservers
of the enterprise and to overlook the possibility of farsighted
economic leadership and responsibility.
It is to this fundamental ill that we address our attention in
this article. While we focus on the present status of a particular
legal doctrine, the business judgment rule, we raise the broad ques-
tion whether it is possible to devise institutional conditions that
breathe new life into the fiduciary concept and encourage corporate
executives to flourish as truly responsible leaders. Specifically, we
inquire whether means of internal corporate governance can be
devised to remove or reduce our dependence on the adversary
culture and its negative economic consequences.
The traditional business judgment rule has been substantially
re-invigorated in the wake of the corporate "Watergates" of the
past decade and has received considerable attention in recent
judicial decisions. The balance of this article summarizes the scope
and purpose of the rule and certain key developments in its applica-
tion over the past decade. In the concluding section, the focus is on
recent extensions of the business judgment rule which suggest that
it could play a still broader role in the future.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The Traditional Rule
The business judgment rule was developed by the courts as a
device for insulating corporate decision makers, both officers and
directors,7 from personal liability for mistakes of business judgment
7. Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969), affd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1980);
3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §1039, at 38 (perm. ed. 1975).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss1/2
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
arrived at in good faith.' Firmly rooted in the common law,9 the rule
has also made recent appearances in statutory formulations of direc-
tors' obligations to their corporations.'"
The traditional business judgment rule has been stated as
follows:
In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the
directors or of a gross abuse of discretion the business
judgment of the directors will not be interfered with by
the courts. . . . The acts of directors are presumptively
acts taken in good faith and inspired for the best interests
of the corporation, and a minority stockholder who
challenges their bona fides of purpose has the burden of
proof."
Application of the business judgment rule presupposes that a court
has made initial determinations that the officers or the board of
directors acted in good faith and in the exercise of due care,' 2 and
8. See generally Comment, The Business Judgment Rule: A Guide to Cor-
porate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 151 (1962); Lewis, The Business Judg-
ment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV.
157 (1970); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); War-
shaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. 148, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. 153,
160 A.2d 731, 738 (1960); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971); Prince v. Bensinger, 224 A.2d
89, 94 (Del. Ch. 1968); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264
(1927).
10. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §35, Para. 2 (1976): "A direc-
tor shall perform his duties as a director ... in good faith, in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an or-
dinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances."
See Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef?, 35 Bus.
LAW 919 (1980); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor but Charted Chan-
nek A Response, 35 Bus. LAW (1980).
11. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. 148, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966). Another
court has stated: "[Slince the transaction complained of was accomplished as a result of
the exercise of independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors
whose sole interest was the furtherance of the corporate enterprise, the court is
precluded from substituting its uninformed opinion for that of the experienced, in-
dependent board members ...." Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971).
Accord, Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 212, 324, 124 Cal. Rptr. 313,
329 (1975); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 426, 431 (1952); Pollitz v.
Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1921); Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis.
333, 55 N.W.2d 426 (1952).
12. With regard to the due care aspect of directors' duties, the courts initially
presume that reasonable diligence has been exercised. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Goldsamt,
380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977); Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905,
911-12 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). With respect to good faith and
disinterestedness, however, courts are in general less willing to presume that directors
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that they did in fact exercise "judgment."13 If these conditions are
met, a court will cut short its review of the underlying business
decision. To borrow from the language of administrative law, the ap-
propriate scope of review is to look to the procedures underlying
the decision, to check for arbitrariness or caprice, but not to inquire
into the substance of a judgment better left to those with expertise
and business acumen.
Within the ambit of its application, the business judgment rule
can be a powerful instrument for diffusing power and responsibility
and for encouraging entrepreneurial risk-taking." In its classic form,
however, the rule was confined to insulating corporate directors and
officers from personal liability arising from their business decisions.
The protection of the rule was not extended to the corporation
itself.
Stockholders' Derivative Actions
The name "business judgment rule" has long been applied to a
doctrine that is in certain respects distinct from the traditional rule
discussed above. The traditional rule was designed by the courts to
protect individual members of management from personal liability
for simple errors of judgment. Since the beginning of this century, 5
have discharged their duty. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S.
590, 599 (1921). But see Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. 148, 221 A.2d at 492-93.
Regardless of the burden of proof, the business judgment rule is applied only when
both tests are met. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See
generally Comment, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 8, at 154-55.
13. When the courts say that they will not interfere in matters of
business judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasonable
diligence-has in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his eyes to
what is going on about him in the conduct of the business of the corpora-
tion and have it said that he is exercising business judgment.
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43.
14. For example, the rule gives management freedom from being second-
guessed should it tend to the long-term interests of the corporation and its
stockholders instead of realizing short-term profits in a takeover. See Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980): "Corporations in the kind of
business as important as that in which Marshall Field was engaged plan to exist as on-
going commercial or merchandising entities. Plaintiffs appear to believe that large
companies like Field are developed for takeovers. . . .Plaintiffs are mistaken .. "
Compare Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,603 (2d Cir. 1980), with Johnson v. Trueblood, No. 79-1892 (3d Cir. July 31, 1980).
15. See, e.g., Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463
(1903): "The directors may sometimes properly waive a legal right vested in the cor-
poration in the belief that its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on such
right." See Estes, Corporate Governance in the Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REV. 50 (1980)
(discussing evolution of business judgment rule).
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courts have applied similar concepts to bar maintenance by
shareholders of lawsuits, brought against third parties
"derivatively" in the right and on behalf of their corporation, when
a disinterested board of directors has decided in good faith that the
interests of the corporation would not be served by such suits."
In an early leading case, the Supreme Court refused to permit
a shareholder to maintain a derivative action based on the antitrust
laws when the board of directors had decided not to pursue the
claim. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brandeis wrote:
Whether or not the corporation shall seek to enforce in
the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other
business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal
management and is left to the discretion of the directors,
in the absence of instruction by a vote of the stock-
holders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion
intra vires the corporation, except where the directors
are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or
where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an un-
prejudiced exercise of judgment. . ...
It should be noted that the decision not to sue need not be based
primarily on the legal merits of the claim. "To the contrary, the
essence of the business judgment rule in this context is that direc-
tors may freely find that certain meritorious actions are not in the
corporation's best interests to pursue." 8
16. As a procedural mechanism to ensure that the board will have an oppor-
tunity to consider the merits of the underlying claim before derivative litigation is
commenced, many jurisdictions require a prospective plaintiff to make demand upon
the board to institute its own action. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1; DEL. RULE OF THE
COURT OF CHANCERY 23.1. See Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Cathedral
Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955). "The demand require-
ment enables corporate management to pursue alternative remedies, thus often ending
unnecessary litigation." Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). See generally Dent, The Power of Direc-
tors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation" The Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 NEV.
U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder
Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168 (1976).
17. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263
(1917).
18. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis in
original). See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d at 275: "Even if a par-
ticular suit has some merit, the litigation costs and the adverse effect on the business
relationship between the corporation and the potential defendant might outweigh any
potential recovery in the lawsuit."
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So long as the procedural conditions of the rule are satisfied,
the board's judgment not to sue unrelated third parties,19 or even
particular officers 0 or directors," will not be second-guessed by the
courts. Business judgment initiation of dismissal of a derivative suit
is thus a special application of the general business judgment rule,
based on the same theory: "an individual stockholder has no more
right to challenge by a derivative suit a decision by the board of
directors not to sue than to so challenge any other decision by the
board."'
With respect to derivative lawsuits against members of man-
agment, moreover, business judgment dismissal interposes the rule
at a novel and important stage. No longer is the rule limited to
protecting an individual officer or director from personal liability on
the merits. Instead, the question is whether it is in the interests of
the corporation to maintain a legal action against an officer or direc-
tor regardless of the merits of the suit, and the issue is resolved by
the board of directors subject only to judicial review of the good
faith and disinterestedness of the decision.
A New Approach to Questionable Payments
Use of the business judgment rule to shelter corporations from
burdensome litigation was nowhere more evident than in the wake
of the recent revelations by dozens of major corporations about
foreign and domestic "questionable payments.""u Promptly following
their public disclosure of such payments, many of these corporations
19. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903). See also
Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Klotz v. Consol. Edison
Co., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Cretito
Finanziario-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
20. See Gilbert v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 179 Misc. 641, 38 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup.
Ct. 1942); Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359, 41 N.E.2d 181 (1942).
21. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 IlL App. 2d 173, 237
N.E.2d 776 (1968).
22. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957).
23. For a useful discussion of corporate disclosures in this area, see SENATE
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 37-43 (Comm. Print 1976). See generally Coffee, Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effec-
tive Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis:
The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 547 (1976).
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were deluged" with derivative actions seeking to hold persons who
had been directors at the time of the payments liable for corporate
waste and for incurring contingent liabilities, for example, under the
federal securities laws.2 5
One of the most striking developments associated with the
questionable payments cases has been the widespread use of minor-
ity committees of disinterested directors," usually assisted by in-
dependent legal counsel, to investigate the merits of possible cor-
porate claims and to decide, on behalf of the full board, whether or
not to maintain the action. A leading example is Gall v. Exxon
Corp.," where a derivative action was instituted based on ques-
tionable political payments in Italy, amounting to $59 million from
1963 to 1974. Exxon established a Special Committee on Litigation,
comprised of one employee director (who did not join the board until
after 1974) and two outside directors, which conducted an extensive
investigation and then concluded that Exxon should seek dismissal
of the derivative suit.5 The court in Gall specifically condoned use of
a minority board committee when the conditions of good faith and
disinterest are satisfied:
24. For example, at least four derivative actions were filed by minority
stockholders of ITT. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 466 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). In addition, the SEC investigated ITT, with the result that a consent
decree was entered whereby the company not only would maintain the Special Review
Committee of its board but would also appoint a "Review Person" to review the work
of the committee. See SEC International Tel. & Tel. Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC L. REP (CCH) 196,948 (D.D.C. 1979).
25. To the extent that these suits alleged only corporate waste and could not
find a federal disclosure violation, they have often been dismissed by the federal
courts. See, e.g., Lewis v. Elam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
196,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
26. The committee must be entirely unbiased if it is to provide the Corpora-
tion with access to the business judgment rule. See Grynberg v. Farmer, [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,683 (D. Colo. 1980). State law generally permits a board
of directors to delegate its powers to a committee. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(c) (1975) (Delaware Corporation Law). See generally McMullen, Committees of the
Board of Directors, 29 Bus. LAW 755 (1974); 3 J. CORP. LAW 400 (1978). As of June 30,
1978, the New York Stock Exchange made it a prerequisite of listing that each
domestic company maintain an audit committee of independent directors.
27. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See 3 J. CORP. LAw 208 (1977).
28. Among other factors considered, the Committee cited the unfavorable pros-
pects for success in the litigation, the cost of the suit, the interruption of corporate
business activity that would result, and the undermining of personnel morale that
might occur. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. at 514 n.13.
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The focus of the business judgment rule inquiry is on
those who actually wield the decision-making authority,
not on those who might have possessed such authority at
different times and under different circumstances. In no
sense was the decision of the Special Committee not to
sue merely an advisory one. Indeed, in carrying out its in-
vestigation and in reaching its conclusions, the Special
Committee exercised the full powers of the Board.'
Nevertheless, the court declined to grant summary judgment in
order to allow the plaintiff to test the independence of the Special
Committee through discovery.
General Telephone & Electronics Corporation (GTE) also was
subjected to a series of derivative claims immediately following the
report of its board of directors' Audit Committee disclosing the mak-
ing of certain questionable payments.' GTE responded to the stock-
holders' suits by establishing a second independent committee, called
the Special Litigation Committee, which was comprised of three
directors who had joined the board after the payments were made.
After conducting an investigation, the committee recommended that
the general counsel seek dismissal of the actions.3 1
In Auerbach v. Bennett, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's entry of summary judgment in one of the ac-
tions brought on behalf of GTE. The Court of Appeals correctly
noted that the business judgment question presented a two-tiered
aspect since the underlying corporate action, the payments to
foreign government and private customers, was itself the product of
29. Id. at 517. See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971).
30. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc L. REP (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Parkoff v. General Tel.
& Elec. Corp., 74 App. Div. 2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1980); Auerback v. Bennett, 64
App. Div. 2d 98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1978), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393
N.E.2d 994 (1979).
31. The Committee based its recommendation on its conclusions
that none of the individual defendants had violated the New York State
statutory standard of care, that none had profited personally or gained in
any way, that the claims asserted in the present action are without merit,
that if the action were allowed to proceed the time and talents of the cor-
poration's senior management would be wasted on lengthy pretrial and
trial proceedings, that litigation costs would be inordinately high in view
of the likelihood of success, and that the continuing publicity could be
damaging to the corporation's business.
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
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business decisions intended to advance the corporate interests. That
first tier was then sought to be protected by the interposition of a
Special Litigation Committee which determined that no claims
should be pursued. "The motions for summary judgment were
predicated principally on the report and determination of the special
litigation committee and on the contention that this second-tier cor-
porate action insulated the first-tier transactions from judicial in-
quiry and was itself subject to the shelter of the business judgment
doctrine."32 Although the committee consisted of only three
members of the board, the court upheld its action by analogy to the
familiar principle that a disinterested minority may approve transac-
tions between a corporation and one or more of its directors. In ad-
dition, "[c]ourts have consistently held that the business judgment
rule applies where some directors are charged with wrongdoing, so
long as the remaining directors making the decision are
disinterested and independent.""
Thus, the decision of the Special Litigation Committee was suf-
ficient under New York law to insulate the first-tier business judg-
ment (that the foreign payments be made) from further inquiry. Re-
view at the second level was procedural and involved only the good
faith and disinterest of the committee. It should be noted that the
layering of the business judgments effectively precluded even pro-
cedural review of the first tier. That is, the Auerbach court did not
address the good faith of the officers and directors who knew of or
approved the foreign payments, but only that of the committee
which reviewed the underlying transaction.'
32. Id at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
33. Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court
elaborated on the business judgment doctrine itself:
It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in
part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped
and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially
business judgments. The authority and responsibilities vested in cor-
porate directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the
assumption that inescapably there can be no available objective standard
by which the correctness of every corporate decision may be measured,
by the courts or otherwise. Even if that were not the case, by definition
the responsibility for business judgments must rest with. the corporate
directors; their individual capabilities and expertise peculiarly qualify
them for the discharge of that responsibility. Thus, absent evidence of
bad faith or fraud (of which there is none here) the courts must and prop-
erly should respect their determinations.
Id at 630-31, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27 (emphases added).
34. Auerbach has been followed in the dismissal of another derivative suit in-
volving GTE, Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 74 App. Div. 2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1980).
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The same conclusions were reached by a federal court in
Rosengarten v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 5 where
several shareholders' derivative suits were brought against ITT
after its Legal Affairs Committee reported questionable payments
of about $3.8 million. ITT established a Special Review Committee
composed of three outside directors who had not been affiliated with
the corporation at the time of the payments. The committee con-
ducted its own investigation (concluding that the payments in fact
amounted to $8.7 million) and decided that the company was not in-
jured by the payments since they were a necessary means of obtain-
ing foreign business. In addition, the committee found that none of
the defendants had acted improperly or for personal benefit and
that the suits were unnecessary as policing actions since ITT had
subsequently adopted a policy forbidding such payments. Finally,
the committee determined that the substantial problems, including
cost, that would arise from the litigation did not support allowing
the suits to proceed.
The district court in Rosengarten made preliminary findings
that the Special Review Committee acted in good faith and con-
sidered appropriate factors in reaching its decision. The court also
found that reliance on independent legal counsel for much of the in-
vestigatory work was permissible, even desirable, and that the com-
mittee's inquiry had not been hampered by friendship or other con-
flicts of interest. Having made this review of the underpinnings of
the business judgment rule, the court went no further:
In light of all the factors discussed above, we find
that the Committee's decision not to pursue these
lawsuits was made in the exercise of its bona fide
business judgment. This finding does not deal with the
propriety or impropriety of the practices which are the
subject of the lawsuits.'
As in Auerbach, satisfaction of the business judgment conditions at
the second tier was held to be sufficient to insulate the primary
business decisions-the practices which are the subject of the
lawsuits-from review even at the level of procedure.
Similar issues were raised in a recent case in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, Abbey v. Control Data Corp.7 There,
35. 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
36. Id. at 829.
37. 460 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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Control Data responded to a derivative suit by creating a minority
Special Litigation Committee which, after a concededly disinterested
inquiry, recommended that the action be dismissed. 8 Applying the
procedure enunciated by the Supreme Court in Burks v. Lasker,5
the court of appeals looked to the relevant state corporate law in
the absence of an overriding federal statutory policy, and concluded
that Delaware law permitted an independent board committee to
terminate the derivative action."
The disclosure of questionable payments by hundreds of major
United States corporations led to many corporate "Watergates" like
those addressed in Gall, Auerbach, Rosengarten and Abbey. As a
result of their innovative use of independent board committees, how-
ever, many of the companies involved created a strong watchdog
function that, without resort to litigation, led to recoveries of
monetary damages from some individuals and to the institution of
changes in top management as well as new programs and policies to
prevent the recurrence of unlawful activity. The special committees
generally achieved levels of corporate accountability and governance
that no adversary proceedings could have accomplished.
At the same time these committees were able to fend off
a rash of lawyer-inspired stockholder suits by convincing
the courts that they, not some stockholder represented by
a lawyer looking for easy work and substantial fees,
should have the exclusive right to make all determina-
tions as to corporate rights against management."
38. This decision was based on the following considerations: none of the
defendant directors had personal knowledge that the foreign payments
were illegal; none of the defendant directors personally profited from
those payments; the payments were intended to serve CDC's business in-
terests; the litigation would seriously disrupt the effectiveness of a highly
successful senior management team, to CDC's detriment; full public
disclosure or the details of the foreign payments might prejudice CDC's
present and future business activities and possibly even endanger the
lives of some CDC employees; the defendant directors fully cooperated
with the committee's investigation and with the investigation of the
United States; and the United States, following its investigations, elected
not to bring criminal or civil charges against the defendant directors.
Id. at 1244.
39. 441 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1979). See notes 75-79 infra and accompanying text.
40. The soundness of this determination has been cast in some doubt by the
recent decision of Vice Chancellor Hartnett in Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800 (Del.
Ch. March 18, 1980). See notes 56-62 infra and accompanying text.
41. Johnson, Fiduciary Ethics and the Market supra note 1, at 45.
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The questionable payments controversy, therefore, opened a bold
new horizon for the business judgment rule.
Federal Securities Cases
In addition to supporting state law protection of officers and
directors from personal liability, the principles underlying the
business judgment rule have been applied in federal securities cases
to insulate corporate entities from liability in certain circumstances.
In-Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 2
the Second Circuit considered corporate and individual liability aris-
ing from delayed corporate disclosure of a rich mineral strike, in
violation of the prompt disclosure requirements of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5. Echoing language familiar
from the state law rule, the court determined that, absent trading
by insiders, "the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business
judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the management
of the corporation. . . ."'I If no other prohibited activity occurred,
Rule 10b-5 liability would not attach so long as nondisclosure of
material information served a legitimate "corporate purpose."4
Taking its cue from Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit more fully articulated the Rule 10b-5 defense
of corporate purpose in Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. 5 In that case, a mutual fund sued McDonnell Douglas
for failing promptly to disclose that its earnings would be drastically
reduced. Release of the information had been delayed for several
days while management checked the extent of production hold-ups
and inventory write-offs. After noting that the case involved only
corporate "silence," not actual misrepresentation, the court all but
embraced the business judgment rule in its classic form:
Since the timing decision is one concerned fundamen-
tally and almost exclusively with matters of discretion
and the exercise of business judgment, it is appropriate to
42. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). Even before the Second Circuit's decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, it had
been recognized that Rule 10b-5 "does not impose a general obligation to publicly
disclose all business secrets, when sound business practice indicates discretion."
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (emphasis added),
affd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on reh. on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 850 n.12 (emphasis added).
44. Al.
45. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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consider the rationale of the "business judgment" rule....
The business judgment rule has been expressed in a varie-
ty of ways but it may be stated that the directors and of-
ficers of a corporation will not be held liable for errors or
mistakes in judgment, pertaining to law or fact, when
they have acted on a matter calling for the exercise of
their judgment or discretion, when they have used such
judgment and have so acted in good faith. . . . The rule
itself, of course, is not directly applicable, and it is not to
be so applied here, but the reasons for it are considered
as extended to the corporate entity. . . . [W]e must hold
that the decision of the officers or directors, and the cor-
porate decision of the defendant to issue an earnings
statement on other than the customary date for such
statements, and the timing of such statement was a mat-
ter of discretion. 6
The opinion in McDonnell Douglas has the business judgment
rule straining at the leash. The court of appeals would not apply the
rule outright because it has historically been thought to protect only
individual officers and directors, not corporate entities. But the ra-
tionale of the rule, including the lack of expertise of judge and jury
in this area and the need for effective and unimpaired decision mak-
ing, 7 prompted the court to apply the Rule 10b-5 corporate purpose
defense at the entity level. 8 Surely this is little more than the tradi-
tional business judgment rule masquerading as a new doctrine.
A recent district court case has taken a salutary step toward
unmasking the application of the business judgment rule in
securities cases. In State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor
Corp.,9 a pension fund that sold Fluor stock sued the company for
46. Id. at 518 (emphases added).
47. Id. See generally 5A A. Jacobs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 §88.04(a), at 4-8
(1978).
48. For similar determinations of a legitimate corporate purpose, see Segal v.
Coburn Corp. of America, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,002, at
94,020 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 193,322, at 91,732 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 588 (D. Utah 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); In re Investors Management Co., SEC Rel.
No. 34-9267 (July 29, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
178,163, at 80,521.
49. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,340 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). See Vaughan. Timing of Disclosure, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 911 (1980).
1980]
Johnson and Osborne: The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
64 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
delaying disclosure of a major contract with SASOL, a South
African company. SASOL made a preliminary award of the contract
to Fluor on February 25, 1980, but disclosure was delayed until
March 10, 1980, so that SASOL could involve the French govern-
ment in financing the project.'
In Fluor, the court tied the business judgment theories of
Texas Gulf Sulphur and McDonnell Douglas directly to the scienter
requirement articulated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.' Corporate
executives who exercise honest business judgment do not possess
the "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud" 2 that Rule 10b-5 pro-
hibits. Thus, the court stated in Fluor:
Some years prior to the decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, supra, the courts began to borrow the
"business judgment" rule from general corporate law to
protect officers and directors of corporations from 10b-5
liability for the exercise of their good faith discretion....
The rationale for the rule is that in order to make the cor-
poration function effectively, those having management
responsibility must have the freedom to make in good
faith the many necessary decisions quickly and without
the fear of potential liability for an honest error in judg-
ment."
On this basis, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant corporation since its officers had made a good faith
business decision to preserve the confidentiality of the contract
award while financing was being negotiated. Any reluctance to apply
the business judgment rule to the corporate entity was discarded.
PROBLEMS IN THE MODERN BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Fiduciary Obligations
One of the conditions of access to the traditional business judg-
ment rule has always been the disinterestedness of the officers or
50. It is notable that the delay-in-disclosure cases have so far involved only a
few weeks' delay. There is no reason in principle why the business judgment delay
should not be upheld for longer periods (nor is there authority to the contrary), par-
ticularly if the information itself develops gradually over a substantial period.
51. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "[Wle are quite unwilling to extend the scope of
[§10(b)] to negligent conduct." I& at 214.
52. I& at 193; see State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,340, at 97,252.
53. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,340, at 97,253.
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directors involved. The business judgment rule bars judicial inquiry
only into actions "taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest
judgment in the lawful furtherance of corporate purposes."' When a
claim is brought against corporate executives on the basis, not that
they erred in pursuit of the interests of the shareholders, but rather
that they placed their own interest above their fiduciary duty to
corporate owners, then their actions are judged according to a stan-
dard of "entire fairness" instead of "business judgment."55
In the double-tiered questionable payments cases, this principle
of disinterestedness emerged as a requirement that the review com-
mittees be composed entirely of directors who had no involvement
with the practices which they were charged to investigate. It may
also be significant in these cases that the underlying corporate ac-
tion-the making of questionable payments-was not self-serving on
the part of executives but was intended to advance corporate in-
terests. Certainly, this was a factor often cited by the review com-
mittees in determining not to bring suit on behalf of the corpora-
tions.
Only one court has been presented squarely with the question
whether a principled distinction can be drawn between (1) indepen-
dent review by a board committee of action which arguably served
corporate interests and (2) equally independent committee review of
conduct alleged to have been a violation of some fiduciary obligation.
In Maldonado v. Flynn,56 the Delaware Chancery Court attempted to
draw such a line where the underlying action was an alleged abuse
by its directors of Zapata Corporation's stock option plan to the tax
detriment of the company:
54. Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 74 App. Div. 2d 762, 762, 425
N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (1980) (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. 293, 93 A.2d 107
(1952).
56. Civ. No. 4800 (Del. Ch. March 18, 1980). Cf. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a parallel federal case in which Judge Weinfeld predicted
that Delaware courts would apply the double-tiered principles of Auerbach to the facts
of Maldonado. In a May 29, 1980 order, the Delaware Chancery Court held that Judge
Weinfeld's decision constitutes res judicata and precludes assertion of the state claim
in Delaware court; however, dismissal of the state case was stayed pending the out-
come of the appeal of Judge Weinfeld's decision. In the most recent case arising out of
these facts, Maher v. Zapata Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,549 (S.D.
Tex. 1980), the federal district court looked to state law, as evidenced by the Chancery
Court's March 18, 1980 decision in Maldonado, and concluded that a stockholder's
derivative action could not be dismissed upon the recommendation of a board commit-
tee. The court also questioned the independence of the Zapata committee "in view of
the fact that the Committee was appointed by the alleged wrongdoers." Id., at 97,865.
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Maldonado's complaint does not attack as improper the
1979 decision of the Committee to seek the dismissal of
this litigation, which was probably an exercise of business
judgment, although it was irrelevant to the dismissal
issue now before me. Rather, Maldonado is attacking the
1974 decision of the directors to accelerate the option
dates as being in bad faith or in breach of the directors'
fiduciary duties. Although it is not necessary at this time
to decide the issue, the 1974 decision to accelerate the op-
tions may not be entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule because the directors had a personal in-
terest in that decision."
Vice Chancellor Hartnett proceeded to decide against Zapata's mo-
tion to dismiss on grounds related both to the nature of derivative
actions and to the context of alleged breach of fiduciary duty:
The stockholder's right to litigate is secondary to the cor-
porate right to bring suit only for so long as the corpora-
tion has not decided to refuse to bring suit. Once the cor-
poration refuses, or impliedly refuses, to assert an ap-
parently valid claim, involving a breach of fiduciary duty
by corporate directors, the stockholder is vested with a
primary and independent right to redress the wrong by
bringing a derivative suit. 8
At least where breach of fiduciary duty is alleged, therefore, the
Delaware court rejected the efficacy of the second-tier business
judgment to preclude judicial review of corporate action:
Under our system of law, courts and not litigants
should decide the merits of litigation. Aggrieved stock-
holders of Delaware corporations ought to be able to ex-
pect that an impartial tribunal, and not a committee ap-
pointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether a
stockholder's derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary
duty has any merit.59
57. Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800, slip op. at 15. Maldonado has recently
been followed on this issue in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Civ. No. CA
79-0073-R (E.D. Va. August 6, 1980).
58. Maldonado v. Flynn, Cir. No. 4800, slip op. at 22 (emphasis added). The
court relied (p. 19) on the dual aspect of derivative suits expressed in Cantor v. Sachs,
18 Del. Ch. 359, 365-66, 162 A. 73, 76 (1932). But see cases cited at notes 15-22 supra and
accompanying text.
59. Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800, slip op. at 23.
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The distinction suggested in Maldonado is perhaps deceptively
appealing. True, the Zapata directors' decision to accelerate their
stock options in 1974 was not entitled to any shelter behind the
business judgment rule. But the independent committee review
upheld in Auerbach and related cases constituted a second judg-
ment, that the best interests of the corporation would not be served
by bringing suit: this is not a matter of whether the claim has any
merit but instead encompasses diverse business factors such as the
disruption that a lawsuit brings, the accompanying publicity and the
impact on employees' morale. Indeed, as Judge Weinstein said in the
parallel Maldonado case in federal court, "the essence of the
business judgment rule in this context is that directors may freely
find that certain meritorious actions are not in the corporation's
best interests to pursue."' °
If the underlying decision was to facilitate corporate activity
by making questionable payments, that would be a legitimate factor
to be considered by the review committee, presumably making a
conclusion not to seek corporate recovery more likely in such cases.
So long as the second judgment is disinterested and made in the ex-
ercise of due care, however, the impact of dismissal on shareholders
is the same whether the first-level decision was in violation of a
fiduciary duty or in advancement of corporate interests. In either
case, the review committee is presumably deciding not to seek a
recovery that could ultimately redound to each shareholders' finan-
cial benefit. To hold that any violation of fiduciary obligations uni-
quely injures shareholders in ways (presumably nonfinancial) that
other misconduct does not, as Vice Chancellor Hartnett implied,
necessarily resurrects his related theory of the primary and in-
dependent right of shareholders to bring derivative suits, contrary
to the generally-accepted rule of United Copper Securities that the
right of action belongs to the corporation."'
At bottom, the court in Maldonado seemed to be suspicious of
the apparent ease with which unscrupulous directors could insulate
themselves from derivative suits by appointing new board members
to form a committee guaranteed not to pursue corporate claims
60. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 285 (emphasis in original). See factors
cited in notes 28, 31, 35 and 38 supra and accompanying text.
61. See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra. Of course, to the extent a
shareholder has been harmed in any individual capacity by breach of a director's
fiduciary obligation, nothing in the business judgment rule as currently applied would
preclude an independent action based on a direct rather than a derivative claim.
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against them.2 The court was surely right to be wary of such
abusive conduct; any evidence that committee members have been
hand-picked to ensure a particular result should eviscerate the
second-tier protection of committee review. The appropriate
mechanism for achieving this result, however, is not to deny
business judgement rule dismissals in all cases alleging underlying
violations of fiduciary duties. Instead, when there is evidence that
the directors have abused the independent committee procedures,
the court should deny access to the business judgment rule on the
ground that its necessary conditions have not been met: Auerbach is
entirely consistent with denying any power to a review committee
that is neither truly independent nor conducts its deliberations in
good faith and with due care.
The Maldonado court's valid concern over the committee's in-
dependence apparently prompted it to reach an unsound and over-
board denial of second-tier business judgment dismissals in cases
alleging breach of fiduciary duty. It is apparent, nevertheless, that
the business judgment rule has been, and should be, sensitive to
conflicts of interest. Perhaps a middle ground is possible. The ques-
tionable payments cases support the view that shareholders seeking
to persevere in their derivative actions must first produce some
evidence that the review committee was not truly disinterested;
perhaps the burden of proof of independence should be shifted when
the underlying conduct involves an alleged breach of fiduciary duty
by directors. In future cases presenting issues like those in
Maldonado, business judgment dismissal should be entered only if
the defendants establish the independence of any board committee
that recommends against corporate action." If that burden is met,
however, business judgment rule dismissal of derivative claims
should be made available regardless of the nature of the underlying
conduct.
Attorney-Client Privilege
The questionable payments and subsequent cases have estab-
lished that use of an independent board committee to investigate
62. See also Maher v. Zapata Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,549,
at 97,864-65 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (following Maldonado). It should be noted, however, that
this concern would not necessarily apply to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by non-
director officers and employees. Moreover, the independent status which many outside
directors enjoy in the business community and the growing popularity of nominating
committees may alleviate the problem.
63. Substantially the same solution is proposed in Black & Smith, Business
Judgment, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 935, 937-38 (1980). See also Estes, Corporate Governance
in the Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REV. 50 (1980). See Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care
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corporate practices may enhance access to the business judgment
rule. In effect, the resources of the corporation are placed in the ser-
vice of its self-policing body and societal resources are conserved by
the policy of deference once the independence and good faith of the
committee and the thoroughness of its procedures have been reviewed.
Because of these advantages, independent committee investigations,
usually with the assistance of independent counsel, have been used
extensively despite the absence of any law requiring their use. 4
As demonstrated by the many questionable payments investi-
gations, the usefulness of independent board committees is depend-
ent in large measure on their ability to engage the services of in-
dependent legal counsel. 5 Committee counsel both advises as to the
applicable legal standards and conducts much of the factual investi-
gation, including interviews and document review. Employees are
generally instructed to cooperate with the investigating counsel,
without the overshadowing atmosphere of adversary process and
compelled discovery that would prevail in a civil or administrative
proceeding. Such cooperation, in turn, has been desirable from cor-
porate management's point of view because the investigation truly
is for the company, conducted by lawyers employed by it (although
selected by the committee), and protected by the attorney-client
privilege. The privilege ensures the free flow of information to the
internal investigators, with the result that they can uncover the full
facts and make appropriate recommendations concerning corrective
and legal action.
The advantages of using independent committees and their
counsel for the identification and correction of corporate problems
have recently been threatened by the decision in United States v.
Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,603 (2d Cir. 1980); Grynberg v. Farmer,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,683 (D. Colo. 1980).
64. It has been suggested that such investigations may sometimes be required
in order to discharge directors' obligations of due care when they have notice of ques-
tionable practices. See Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining
the Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's Communications With Investigative
Counse 35 Bus. LAW. 5, 7-8 (1979) (dealing extensively with the issue discussed in this
section). It will be a rare case, however, in which the duty of care will require a com-
mittee inquiry with assistance of counsel.
65. The Voluntary Disclosure Program of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, created to deal with the questionable payments investigations of the 1970s,
recommended that board committees retain outside counsel. See SENATE BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM.. 94TH CONG.. 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES 8 (Comm. Print 1976). See generally Silverstein, Special Problems Regard-
ing the Role of Counsel, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEE 78, 83-85
(P.L.I. 1978).
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The Upjohn Co.," holding that information given by middle-
management personnel to counsel conducting an independent in-
vestigation is not within the protection of the attorney-client
privilege. Until this matter is resolved, it is unlikely that many cor-
porations will authorize a thorough internal inquiry concerning cor-
porate conduct or other potential liabilities and thereby risk civil
discovery of counsel's notes that would provide a road-map for
subsequent plaintiffs.
In Upjohn, an investigation concerning questionable foreign
payments was made by in-house counsel with the assistance of out-
side lawyers: "At the request of Upjohn's top management, officers
and employees of the company were urged to respond to counsel's
questions candidly and confidentially. The responses were recorded
in answers to written questionnaires and in counsel's notes and
memoranda describing oral interviews. '8 7 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice sought and obtained the documents prepared by counsel except
with respect to statements made by the management control group,
which was held to "possess an identity analogous to the corporation
as a whole" 8 and thus to constitute the "client" for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege." The court rejected the broader subject-
matter standard for the privilege, which protects information given
to corporate counsel by any employee who obtained it as a result of
the subject matter of the employee's responsibilities.7 1
66. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 925, (1980). See In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Amerada Hess
Corp., [Advance Sheets] STAND. FED. TAX REP (CCH) 19,160. See generally Block &
Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations, supra note 64.
67. United States v. The Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1225.
68. Id. at 1226.
69. See City of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus denied sub nora. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1962). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 81 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979).
See generally H."MILSTEIN. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOC-
TRINE: CORPORATE APPLICATIONS (B.N.A. 1980); Note, A ttorney-Client Privilege for Cor-
porate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 242 (1970).
70. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)
(en banc) (investigation of slush fund protected by privilege); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (privilege
applies when "the employee makes the communications at the direction of his
superiors... " and the subject matter relates to employment duties), aff'd without opi-
nion by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 1978-1 TRADE CAS. 162,043 (D.D.C. 1978); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1975).
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The court in Upjohn was no doubt correct to state that "[c]or-
porate counsel should not be the exclusive repository of unpleasant
facts."7 1 The point of special investigations, however, is not to shield
managers from the facts but rather to ensure that all the relevant
facts are brought to the attention of responsible corporate officials
and that adequate attention is given to corrective action, disclosure
and other legal responsibilities. "To the degree that either test pro-
tects communications between management and lower-level
employees, it is the broader 'subject matter' test and not the restric-
tive 'control group' test which enhances such open and honest
discussion."72
A more potent argument against the attorney-client privilege
in this context is that made in In re Grand Jury Investigations,"
recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
There, the court denied the privilege in part because "the potential
costs of undetected noncompliance [with law] are themselves high
enough to ensure that corporate officials will authorize investiga-
tions regardless of an inability to keep such investigations completely
confidential."'" Clearly, there will be such cases; Upjohn and Grand
Jury do not mean that no audit or other committee investigation
will ever again be conducted. Nevertheless, it cannot be expected
that internal inquiries, without the protection of the attorney-client
privilege, will often be so cost-effective as the court implied.
In our view, however, the more important question concerns
the nature of the signals to be sent to corporate management:
Should corporate self-examination and self-policing be a last resort,
fraught with litigation hazards, or should it be encouraged and
sheltered by applicable rules of law? The court in Grand Jury, as in
Upjohn, elected the first alternative and placed a significant impedi-
ment in the way of corporate self-governance. We believe that this
was an unwise policy choice and that the Supreme Court should
ultimately settle the conflict among the circuits by establishing the
subject matter test as the applicable standard. Until this uncertainty
is removed, investigations by audit and other committees cannot
realistically be expected to go below the management control group.
71. United States v. The Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1227.
72. Block & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations, supra note 64, at 16.
73. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 1237.
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Federal Regulatory Policy
The federal courts presently are struggling to define the ap-
propriate scope of business judgment doctrine in the context of suits
brought under specific federal statutes. The question in these cases
is whether investigation by minority committees, in the fashion of
Gall and Auerbach, will be sufficient to terminate stockholders'
derivative actions by means of summary judgment when it is alleged
that strong federal policies have been frustrated.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Burks v.
Lasker,5 a derivative suit based on the Investment Company Act of
1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Shareholders of an
investment company alleged that several members of its board and
the company's investment adviser had violated their statutory and
common law duties by purchasing commercial paper of the Penn
Central Transportation Company. The investment company estab-
lished a minority board committee made up of the five directors not
implicated in the suit. On the basis of its investigation, assisted by
outside counsel, the committee concluded that maintenance of the
action was not in the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders.
The district court held that a federal business judgment rule
was applicable and that it required deference to a good faith conclu-
sion of an independent committee. 8 The court initially permitted
discovery with respect to the independence of the committee's mem-
bers. Then, after finding no evidence of lack of independence or
good faith, it granted summary judgment.77 The court of appeals re-
versed, basing its decision on a construction of the two federal
statutes involved, which it viewed as not permitting the dismissal of
a shareholders' action regardless of the independence of the commit-
tee.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
treated the issue primarily as one of choice of law. The action was
based on two federal statutes, but the existence of a federal right
did not make state law irrelevant. In particular:
This case involves the question whether directors are
authorized to determine that certain claims not be pur-
75. 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), summary judgment entered, 426 F.
Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd & rem'd, 441 U.S.
471 (1979).
76. Burks v. Lasker, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
77. Burks v. Lasker, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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sued on the corporation's behalf. As we have said in the
past, the first place one must look to determine the
powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State's
corporation law .... "Corporations are creatures of state
law," . . . , and it is state law which is the font of cor-
porate directors' powers. By contrast, federal law in this
area is largely regulatory and prohibitory in nature-it
often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only
rarely creates it."8
Thus, the Court held that the first step in applying federal law is to
determine what the state of incorporation would permit directors to
do. As a second step, the lower courts should consider whether the
state law rule is consistent with federal statutory or regulatory
policy. Neither lower court applied this two-pronged test in Lasker,7 9
so the case was remanded.
Burks v. Lasker has thus established an authoritative test that
will be applied in the context of other federal statutes. The standard
is that federal law applies, but that the primary source of federal
law is the relevant state business judgment rule, unless the rule is
inconsistent with an overriding federal policy. Lasker was followed
in Abbey v. Control Data Corp., a sensitive payments case discussed
above."0 It also has been applied in two recent and possibly conflict-
ing opinions in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
In Lewis v. Anderson,8 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered a derivative action against a majority of the direc-
tors of Walt Disney Productions based on their participation in a
stock option plan. A special litigation committee was appointed and
ultimately sought dismissal of the suit." Following Lasker, the court
of appeals first determined that California law would defer to an in-
dependent determination by a board committee to seek dismissal of
the suit. 3 Then, the court considered federal policies expressed in
78. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 478 (citations omitted).
79. The district court applied the business judgment rule as a matter of direct
federal law.
80. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
81. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. The committee consisted of two outside directors appointed after the op-
tion transactions and one director, named as a defendant, who received no benefits
from the challenged conduct.
83. In the absence of direct precedent, the federal court concluded that
California would follow the lead of the other cases previously discussed. "Auerbach
and Abbey reflect a clear trend in corporate law, and we are confident that a Califor-
nia court would follow this trend." Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783.
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section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and in Rule
10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. "Allowing distin-
terested directors to exercise their business judgment to dismiss
what they see as groundless causes of action would in no way
weaken the regulatory provisions of the federal securities laws."' '
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the
district court's foreclosure of the suit by entry of partial summary
judgment.5
More recently, the Second Circuit held in Galef v. Alexander"
that the business judgment rule could not be invoked to bar a
derivative action alleging proxy violations by all of a company's fif-
teen directors. The suit, brought on behalf of TRW, Inc. under sec-
tion 14(a), involved inadequate disclosure with respect to stock op-
tion plans. A majority of TRW's directors, consisting entirely of
directors who received no options (but who approved the plans and
their disclosure), determined that the action was contrary to the
best interests of the company; the district court dismissed pursuant
to the business judgment rule.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followedLasker
and looked to Ohio state law for guidance. The court noted that Ohio
law was unclear but might hold that a director sued merely on ac-
count of having authorized the underlying transaction is sufficiently
disinterested to initiate a business judgment summary dismissal of
the suit."? However, the court went on to declare that even if the
Ohio law would so hold, federal policy expressed in section 14(a)
would be inconsistent: "In short, we conclude that to the extent that
a complaint states claims against directors under §14(a) upon which
relief may be granted, federal policy prevents the summary
dismissal of those claims pursuant to the business judgment of those
defendant directors.""
84. Id. at 784.
85. The district court had reserved the factual question whether the commit-
tee did exercise good faith judgment.
86. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. Id at 61.
88. Id. at 64. The court noted that, in Lewis v. Anderson, two out of three
committee members were not named defendants. Id. at 64 n.20. Galef was carefully
limited to situations in which a federal claim is properly stated against directors and is
not subject to dismissal or summary judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56. In
addition, the court noted that partial summary judgment might be allowed, pursuant
to the relevant state's business judgment rule, for any state law claims joined with the
proxy allegations. Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 67.
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Galef has been distinguished by one of the district courts which
has considered similar issues since the opinion was handed down. In
Maldonado v. Flynn," Judge Weinfeld reviewed the determination
by the Independent Investigation Committee of Zapata Corporation,
composed of two newly-appointed outside directors, that pursuit by
Zapata of any meritorious claim it might have against other direc-
tors pursuant to section 14(a) would not be in the company's best in-
terest. The court found no evidence to contradict the committee's
good faith and disinterestedness; applying the two-step Lasker for-
mula, it further found no conflict between what it perceived as the
Delaware rule permitting dismissal0 and the federal policies of sec-
tion 14(a):9 "the rule does not infringe directly upon the protections
accorded investors by the regulatory scheme of section 14(a). It does
not condone conduct violative of that section."92
An opposite result was reached in Maher v. Zapata Corp.," a
federal case which arose out of the same facts as Maldonado. There,
the court noted the holding of the Chancery Court of Delaware in a
parallel Maldonado opinion that rejected Judge Weinfeld's predic-
tion and declared the Delaware rule to preclude business judgment
dismissal of a derivative action alleging breach of directors'
fiduciary duty.9 ' Although the Supreme Court of Delaware has yet
to address the issue, the court in Maher followed the Chancery
Court precedent and concluded: "Since Delaware law does not per-
mit independent directors to terminate a derivative action against
89. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
90. Although Judge Weinfeld and other federal judges uniformly predicted
that Delaware law would support dismissal in this case, a lower court in Delaware
recently held, in a case parallel to that discussed in the text, that the business judg-
ment rule cannot be relied on to dismiss a derivative suit that alleges breach of
fiduciary duty by directors, even though the committee members making the deter-
mination are not themselves defendants. Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800, slip op. at
22. Subsequently, the Delaware court held that Judge Weinfeld's decision was res
judicata and that it will govern the state case unless it is reversed on appeal in the Se-
cond Circuit. Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800 (Del. Ch. May 29, 1980).
91. "The Court of Appeals' holding [in GaIe]] was premised on the fact that
the directors making the determination to terminate the suit were not disinterested....
The Court of Appeals expressly left undecided whether a state rule permitting non-
defendant directors or an independent committee to initiate a business judgment
dismissal contravenes federal policy, the very issue addressed here." Maldonado v.
Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 286 n.44.
92. Id at 281.
93. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,549 (S.D. Tex. 1980). See also Abella
v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Civ. No. CA 79-0073-R (E.D. Va. August 6, 1980).
94. Maldonado v. Flynn, Civ. No. 4800 (Del. Ch. March 18, 1980). See notes
56-63 supra, and accompanying text.
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other board members, this Court need not address whether the
state law rule of dismissal is consistent with the policies of the
federal securities act. . .. "'I
It seems clear that the Burks v. Lasker tests will take some
time before they are worked out in full by the lower courts. With
rare exceptions, however, such as the peculiar situation in Galef, it
appears that federal courts will be able to apply the business judg-
ment rule, based on action by independent board committees, in a
wide variety of statutory contexts. These developments suggest the
emergence of a powerful new tool based on the fiduciary respon-
sibilities of corporate directors.
A FUTURE ROLE FOR THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The traditional legal doctrine that managers are fiduciaries only
for stockholders and the related executive mind-set were tried and
found wanting in the corporate "Watergates" of the last decade.
Whereas the many audit committee investigations of the 1970's ex-
posed very little misconduct that could be labeled breach of
fiduciary duty to stockholders, they often revealed an excess of zeal
on the part of executives in serving the stockholders' interests nar-
rowly and to the detriment of the larger common good. This excess
of zeal frequently involved violations of domestic and foreign laws
designed to protect consumers or the general public.
We see a need for broadening the constituencies which cor-
porate fiduciaries serve, but we do not suggest that the scope of
fiduciary responsibility be expanded, in the simple-minded adver-
sary spirit of the litigious society, by imposing new forms of per-
sonal liability on executives. Rather we propose the development of
positive incentives that will simplify the lives of corporate officers
and directors who conduct themselves as stewards not only for
stockholders but for consumers and the general public as well." This
95. Maher v. Zapata Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,549, at
97,864.
96. As noted in note 2 supra, C. Merrick Dodd made a similar argument, re-
joined by Adolph Berle, in 1932. The debate over the inadequacy of traditional
fiduciary doctrine has advanced very little since that classic exchange, although it has
continued with new actors. For example, Christopher Stone's 1975 book, Where the
Law Ends, proposed specific mandatory structural reforms designed to cause corpora-
tions to act responsibly toward consumers, communities and employees, only to be sub-
jected to Berle-type criticism for failing to enunciate anything but a vague
thoughtfulness standard of responsibility. See Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979). We side, in effect, with Professor Dodd's pro-
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article has traced the recent development of the business judgment
rule because expansion of this rule under appropriate conditions
might provide one such incentive.
We base our proposal to expand the business judgment rule
primarily on the widespread adoption by large corporations of
reforms in corporate self-governance, including the reconstitution of
boards with a majority of outside directors, the establishment of in-
dependent audit, compensation and nominating committees, and the
adoption of strong internal auditing and control procedures. These
institutional changes provide the basic structures within which an
extension of the business judgment rule should be encouraged to
take place.97
As boards of directors and their monitoring committees become
more independent of management and more public, they should be
encouraged to play a more effective part in determining the policies
that will shape our economic life. We are not proposing as a logical
next step that a corporation should be able to act through its in-
dependent directors as a trial court for resolving major claims
against the corporation. What we are proposing is that a qualified
corporation, faced with a third-party civil action based on tort law
or alleging statutory or regulatory violations, should be able to in-
itiate a business judgment dismissal or summary judgment if the
corporate act in question had been subjected to and approved after
a prior special review by a committee of independent directors. By
qualified corporation we mean at a minimum a reporting98 company
posal to encourage, not to require, broader corporate responsibility. To the Berle-
Engel view that precise standards must first be articulated, we reply that such preci-
sion invites paralysis and that the numerous laws on the books today make sufficiently
clear what society's standards are for responsible corporate action. See Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105-06 (1979) (listing some
current legislative and judicial standards for corporate conduct).
97. It seems unlikely that the recent legal developments traced above would
have occurred if the companies involved had not been following what was, in effect,
the best corporate practice of their time. "The continued willingness of the judiciary to
accept its own concept, the business judgment rule, and to apply it to novel and
stressful fact situations has to be a tribute to the gains that have been made in
strengthening the role of outside directors." Estes, Corporate Governance in the
Courts, 58 HARV. Bus. REv. 50, 60 (1980). Further expansion of the rule should be tied
to continued innovation in the area of responsible corporate self-governance.
98. A reporting company is one which files periodic reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission either voluntarily or as required by §13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1976). Section 13(a) requires
periodic reports from all companies which have securities registered pursuant to §12(a)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §781(a) (1976) (securities traded on a national securities exchange),
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whose board has a majority of non-employee directors. Certain other
qualifications, such as the maintenance of a nominating committee
meeting specified standards, also might be appropriate for this
enlarged access to the business judgment rule.
Obviously, a qualified corporation would not subject every
significant corporate decision to formal committee review so as to
maximize its access to the business judgment defense. Such a policy
would paralyze the company more effectively than the litigation it is
intended to avoid. Most decisions would continue to be made by
management under the general supervision of the full board of
directors." The kinds of major corporate decisions that boards
would deem appropriate for such prior committee review might in-
clude the timing and content of press releases reflecting board ac-
tion likely to have a very substantial impact on the market price of
the corporation's stock, the environmental or safety aspects of im-
portant capital expansions or new lines or products, or the rejection
of merger proposals or tender offers as not being in the best long-
term interests of the corporation. The committee's, determination,
provided it was made in good faith and with due care, could become
a powerful tool for foreclosing claims that a product line or manufac-
turing process was negligently designed or that material informa-
tion was inadequately or dilatorily disclosed. In such a case, sum-
mary judgment would be appropriate once a court had reviewed the
committee's independence and the adequacy of the procedures it
employed.
The role here envisioned for independent directors has close
parallels with the monitoring function of administrative agencies of
government. Indeed, the judicial rhetoric for review of ad-
ministrative decisions resembles the language employed with
respect to the business judgment rule: administrative agencies are
"presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a
specialized field of knowledge"; their "findings within that field
or §12(g), 15 U.S.C. §781(g) (1976) (securities of issuers which have total assets in ex-
cess of $1,000,000 and a class of equity securities held of record by at least 500 per-
sons). Section 15(d) extends the reporting requirements of §13 to companies which
have made a registered offering of their securities and which have at least 300 holders
of such securities. 15 U.S.C. §78 p(d) (1976).
99. Management and board decisions on these lesser matters would, of course,
be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule as traditionally formulated.
In addition, some rule of reason would be appropriate with respect to the submission
of matters to special board committees for prior review: failure to seek such review in
a particular instance should not be cause for penalizing a corporation.
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carry the authority of an expertise which courts do not possess and
therefore must respect."00 Like public administrators, directors and
managers of modern corporations are professionals who possess ex-
pertise that can never be matched by judges.
Despite the close parallel, we see'a need in the economy and in
the nature of the corporate enterprise to have important lines of
power and responsibility emanate not from centralized government
but instead from the public stockholders, those whose economic in-
terests ultimately are at stake. Thus, expansion of the business
judgment rule would be grounded firmly in one of its underlying
policies of diffusing power and placing it among those who have the
necessary practical expertise and accountability."1
Providing legal constraints on corporate action in the form of
limited judicial review of independence and care is a necessary con-
dition of allowing corporate executives to exercise broad respon-
sibilities in the context of an enlarged business judgment rule. Thus,
deference to decisions of independent board committees in the man-
ner contemplated is justified only if the institutional conditions are
ripe, only if the appropriate mechanisms for internal governance are
in place. In this sense, the current trend toward outside directors
and audit, nominating and other independent committees may in-
deed by hailed as a significant step in the evolution of corporate
structure. If legal theory responds to these structural developments
as it has to the use of special litigation committees in the ques-
tionable payments context, a powerful, non-adversatial incentive
toward socially responsible forms of corporate leadership may
develop.
100. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See SEC v.
Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 88, 94 (1943).
101. Chairman Harold Williams of the Securities and Exchange Commission
has made a similar point in relation to subject company responses to tender offers:
"[A]n effective board of directors remains the institution best suited to weigh the oft-
conflicting factors that may influence a corporate response to such a situation." Chair-
man Williams also emphasized the "special responsibilities for competence and objec-
tivity" that the board faces in the takeover context and suggested that access to the
business judgment rule for decisions to oppose an offer should be conditioned on
satisfaction of these responsibilities. "Tender Offers and the Corporate Director," Ad-
dress by Chairman Williams, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
182,445, at 82,880 (Jan. 17, 1980).
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